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PRESIDENT'S NOTES
As the 1975-76 academic year draws
to a close, it seems most appropriate to
reflect briefly on what the College is,
what it does, and where it is going.
First of all, the College is today-as it
has been since 1884-the Navy's senior
institution dedicated to the advanced
professional military education of care
fully selected naval officers who spend
10 months here in the company of
outstanding colleagues from the other
services and from other nations. The
College's business, like that of other
graduate-level institutions, is teaching
and research. We seek to expand the
horizons of the competent professionals
who attend the College and to improve
their ability to deal with today's com
plex problems in an environment char
acterized by uncertainty and rapid
change.
I have been very pleased with the
results achieved by our faculty in
presenting a curriculum of high profes
sional usefulness. In this exciting
process everyone-student, faculty, and
staff-learns and is enriched by an �x
change of views and by the challenges to
and defense of those views.
While the rigorous academic program
we offer the students is our main line of
endeavor, research and publication are
also vital to the academic life of this
institution. The Center for Advanced
Research was opened in March 1975 by
the Secretary of the Navy who enthusi
astically supported the idea of such a

center. Research is performed by stu
dents (Research Associates), former stu
dents at the Naval War College (Gradu
ate Fellows), and others on a wide
variety of topics focusing upon tactical
and strategic concepts. Among our
initial projects was a study by Edward
Luttwak, the first third of which The
Johns Hopkins University Press has
published as The Political Uses of Sea
Power. More recently, the HARPOON
Tactical Employment Study, conducted
by students, has attracted wide Navy
interest and has proven highly useful in
tactical development.
In addition, the Naval War College
Historical Monograph Series was inaugu
rated in 1975. The first in what we hope
will be a productive and stimulating
series is a paper entitled The Writings of
Stephen B. Luce by John D. Hayes and
John Hattendorf. Both Luce, the
founding President of the Naval War
College, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, his
successor, believed that a knowledge of
history held the key to a comprehensive
understanding of the "principles" of the
"art and science" of naval warfare.
Mahan's writings, based in part on his
lectures here, have achieved an enduring
fame. The Writings of Stephen B. Luce
show that he, as well as Mahan, was one
of the great creative thinkers and
dynamic innovators of his time. I am
happy to say that this volume has been
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All too frequently considerations of the use of naval power as an instrument of
foreign policy dwell on its positive results without adequate consideration of its
costs. A fundamental step in sound military planning is determination of aooepta•
bility-what is the objective worth to me and what is its projected cost in political,
materiel, and personnel terms? Ken Booth discusses some of the political costs
Involved in the peacetime use of naval power. These costs and problems can be
ignored only at our peril. His conclusions In regard to the Soviet Navy are rather
startling.

FOREIGN POLICIES AT RISK:
SOME PROBLEMS OF MANAGING NAVAL POWER
by
ProfeBSor Ken Booth
the neo•Clausewitzian emphasis on
clinical instrumentality, in whlch armed
forces are conceiv ed in terms of the
clear-cut missions which they perform
of power are real1 its pleasures
in the pursuit of political goals.
imaginary.
The picture to be presented is en•
Charles C. Colton
tirely and deliberately one-sided, but it
Lacon (1823)
ls an approach which has several values:
(l) By aggregating certain types of naval
behavior, it might help to clarify some
The aim of this essay is to show that
of the inherent problems of using navies
naval power can be an unfortunate
as instruments of policy in distant
influence on foreign policy as well as a
regions. (2) In so doing it may con
useful instrumentj that naval power can
tribute to the debate about the utility
contribute to the distortion of foreign
of navies. This debate often polarizes
policy, as well as to its support; that it
the relatively straig htforward concepts
can be the vehicle for irrational as well
of naval missions as against the oppor•
as rational behavior; and that it can bite
tunity costs of maintaining expensive
the hand that feeds it, as well as snarling
warships. In this polarization, political
at adversaries. The essay is an attempt
costs, which are often indirect, un
to present the other side of the coin to
certain, and fuzzy, tend to be ignored.
(3) By articulating some of the major
Copyright @ 1976 by Kon Booth,
problems of managing naval power, it
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
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must go to those who have it; to
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All too often consideration of questions of logistics is deferred in favor of the

more glamorous and more exciting questions of strategy and tactics. Even so, the

task of logistics is to provide, train 1 equip, and maintain miHtary forces capable of
conductlng sustained combat operations. For this reason logistics establishes very real
limitations to what strategy can accomplish, and at all times it must be a personal
concern of commanders at all levels. Writing on the basis of his experience at the
highest operational and staff levels, Vice Admiral Weschler, in a letter to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), discusses some funda
mentals, current problems, and future prospects of logistics. Some of his recommen
dations are sure to excite discussion.

PRIORITIES AND EMPHASES FOR LOGISTICS, 1976-78
by
Vire Admiral Thomas R. Wcschlcr, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Dr. John J. Bennett
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Logistics)
Room 3E808
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20351
Dear Dr. Bennett:
You have asked me to examine today's logistics principles and precepts
and then, in the light of current opportunities or limitations, to indicate what
steps could be taken to bring abou!'th e best possible logistic s improvement.
First, as to the principles of logistics, the best discussion is Henry E. Eccles'
classic Logistics in the National Defense. *There are also valuable lists
published by the Joint Logistics Commanders in 1967 and again in the
Logistics Systems Plan "LOGPLAN FY 75•81."

Logb;tics in the National Defense is so c omprehensive as to be a textbook
and is based on the author's own firsthand logistics experience in World War
11. It is a distiliation of the fu ndamentals of logistics and logistics' place in the
military scheme. Thus, it is as relevant today as it was nearly 20 years ago.
Four basic points have been developed from this and other sources:
*Henry E. Eccles, Logistics fo the National Defense {Harrisburg, Pa,: Stackpole,
1959).
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Power is an elusive quantity, incapable of being quantified in purely numerical
terms. Rather, it is a derivative of the perceptions of power. For this reason, trends
relating to the waxing or waning of strength and determination and how they are
perceived by oneself, friend,, and enemies are crucially important. Professor Ra'anan
takes im;ue with the minimalists who view the increase of Soviet naval power as
motivated primarily by Soviet defensive considerations. Instead, he argues strongly
that the Soviet Union, recognizing the limitations nuclear weapons have imposed
upon direct conflict with the West, now seeks unilateral gains in the Third World by
the use of surrogates. The Cuban involvement in Angola is only the most recent
example.

TIIE SOVIET VIEW
OF NAVIES IN PEACETIME
based on a lecture
by
Professor Uri Ra'anan
It may be helpful to start by at
tempting to place this topic within its
proper parameters: that is, to focus
upon the issue of pereeptions, as viewed
by theoreticians and policymakers alike
within the Soviet Union and, hopefully,
if one can educate Western analyst,,
outside the U.S.S.R. as well. The reason
for this emphasis is that the concept of
perceptions relates to the crux of the
great ngame" of international comped�
tion and conflict.
I had the honor, some 4½ years ago,
to be asked by the Senate Subcom•
mittee on National Security and Inter
national Operations (of the Committee
on Government Operations) to prepare
an evaluation of the power balance
between the United States and the
Soviet Union. That particular task raised
in my mind some conceptual and
methodological questions, in response
to which I developed a theor y or, if you
prefer, an equation. Although published
by the Senate some 4 years ago, my
conclusions appear to have been uredis
covered11 recently.

My main point was that the leader
ship of the Soviet Union, as evidenced
by the extensive defense and political
literature printed in that country, has
identified power, quite correctly, as a
derivative of perceptions of power. This
means that there are no 11 concrete/'
objective factors that, without further
refinement and qualification, can be
equated, as such, with "power" �i.e., no
purely numerical, quantifiable elements.
Rather, the power of an "actor" on the
international scene (usually a state)
-that is to say, its ability to influence
others and also its own evaluation of
what it may be capable of doing to
influence others-is a function both of
its perception and of its adversary's
perception of what either is able and
willing to do. That perception may or
may not be related directly to the
objective, numerical power factors that
can be measured and quantified.
Who are the "customers,i to whom a
perception of power has to be conveyed
in order to achieve the degree of in•
fluence required by any regime? They
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The Yam Kippur War of 1976 has proven to be a fertile source of analyses and
commentaries, One of its striking features was that, unlike 1956 and 1967, Israel did
not initiate hostilities because Israeli Government decisionmakers assumed that the
Egyptians would not attack first since they could not "win," Major McKenzie-Smith
analyzes the Israeli decision to forbear a preemptive attack in light of the
surrounding circumstances. He concludes that the decision itself was rational, but
more important, he points out that rationality does not necessarily preclude error,

CRISIS DECISIONMAKING IN ISRAEL:
THE CASE OF THE OCTOBER 1973
MIDDLE EAST WAR
by
Major Robert H. McKenzie-Smith, U.S. Army
The Israeli Government, facing the
These two critical decisions merit
crisis which led to the October 1973
examination and study, In light of the
Middle East war, developed strategic
political and military outcomes of the
solutions markedly different from those
October war, these decisions can be seen
developed in both 1956 and 1967 in at
either as the value-maximizing choices
least two significant respects. Both in
of rational political-military decision
1956 and 1967 Israel was the initiator
makers of a government under wartime
of at least the physical hostilities, In
duress 1 or they can be seen, as critics of
the 1973 Meir government have called
October 1973 the Israeli Gover nment
them, as decisionmaking errors.
deliberately chose not to employ the
tactic of preemptive attack which earlier
If rational, the October 1973 deci
sions to forbear preemptive attack and
governments had used in both 1956 and
to delay mobilization should appear as
l 967 and which had, in fact, become
deliberately taken in expectation of
institutionalized as a part of the politi
certain positive political outcomes and
cal-mili tary doctrine of the state. In
taken within the context of some per
addition, in October 1973 the Israeli
ception of cost. Conversely, if seen as
Government declined to order mobiliza
decision errors, some misappreciation of
tion of the large reserve contingents of
the imperfect information which charac
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) until
terizes decisionmaking under un�
just hours before the beginning of the
certainty should be apparent.
coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attack
As in all states, in Israel certain
on Yorn Kippur, the Day of Atonement,
political-military doctrines have evolved 43
6 October
1973,
Published
by U.S.
Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
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of World War II, military planners realized that domestic U.S. oil
be insufficient in the event of another war. The result was that
planners began to address the problem of how to safeguard Middle East, and
particularly Persian Gulf, petroleum sources as early as the autumn of 1945. Using
recently declassified documents, David Rosenberg points out that strategic concerns
about oil supply are not new. More important, he describes the outlook of American
military planners in view of their perception of the Soviet threat and limited U.S.
capabilities as a result of budget outs in the early years of the cold war.
At the end

reserves would

THE U.S. NAVY AND THE PROBLEM
OF OIL IN A FUTURE WAR:
THE OUTLINE OF A STRATEGIC DILEMMA, 1945-1950
by
David Alan Rosenberg
During late 1974 and early 1975,
reports appeared in such publications as
Time, Newsweek, and Harper's de
scribing in detail how the United States
might, in the event of another oil
embargo, militarily intervene to seize
Arab oilfields in order to ensure access

to that essential commodity. The re
ports were generally dismissed by senior
American policymakers. 1 While it re
mains to be seen whether the military
option will be exercised in the Persian
Gulf of the l970's, recently declassified
documents from the late l 940's indicate
that speculation about American mili•
tary action in that area is not a recent
development. Between 1947 and 1950,

enemy in the ev ent of war. The plans
that were prepared and debated within
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the opera•
tions that the Navy conducted to meet
such a threat are described in this
paper?
The first serious recognition by the
United States of the strategic im
portance of the Middle East and its oil
reserves occurred during World War 11.
While American businessmen, mis
sionaries I and naval officers had been

involved with the Arab world of the
Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean
since the birth of the republic; it took
the emergence of modem military
technology with its enormous de
pendence on oil to force American
American strategic planners, in particu
officials to consider the area one of
lar Navy strategists in Washington and
prime importance. The complex nego
Europe, were deeply concerned about
tiations which took place from 1943 to
the possibility of losing Middle Eastern
Published
by U.S. Naval
DigitalRussian
Commons, 1976
1945 among the U.S. Government, the57
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PORTUGAL: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
IN THE CREATION OF A NEW REGIME
Th• collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime jn Portugal in 1974 was followed by a
rapid and seemingly precipitate end to the ancient and extensive Portuguese colonial
empire in Africa. In addition, Portugal Uself has experienced a political ferment in
which the military forces, Communists, Socialists, and others have all sought to bring
about one or another form of political order. In this exam/natfon of the Portuguese
revolution, Professor Bruneau is guardedly optimistic that democracy may yet be the
result of this complex political process.

by
Professor Thomas C. Bruneau
If the overwhelming majority of for•
eign observers were surprised but en•
couraged by the coup of 25 April 1974
which signaled an end to the Salazar·
Caetano regime, the responses to devel•
opments since that time have been
mixed. In part this ambivalence can be
attributed to the developments them•
selves which are both difficult to com•
prehend and almost impossible to place
in a fixed context. Indeed, there is no
fixed context. Not only have the
boundaries of the Portuguese state
changed radically with the independ•
ence of the Afri can colonies and could
change even more if the threatened
independence of the Atlantic islands
comes to pass, but the nature and even
the tendencies of the Portuguese
political system have been volatile and
Copyright @ 1976 by Thomas C. Bruneau.

contradictory. The center of the po•
litical spectrum has shifted wildly from
one side to the other, mainly in a
reactive manner, and the observer has
been treated to a whole series of
seemingly mutually antagonistic po•
litioal solutions to the "Portuguese
crisis. 11 That there is a crisis is obvious,
for not only must the Portuguese re•
cover from an extremely rapid decoloni•
zation and determine the nature of their
economic system, but they must further
resolve the crucial questions of legiti•
macy, the role of the masses, and the
state in a very short period of time.
What took centuries in the rest of
Western Europe must be confronted in
Portugal immediately, and while the
ideas are now present for a resolution of
these problems the socioeconomic

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
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Napoleon Bonaparte's spectacular and dazzling series

of

83
victories not only

made

him for a while the master of continental Europe, but they also provided the impetus
for a remarkable development in military thought in Germany. Starting with
Scharnhorst, reaching its zenith with the profundities (and obscurities) of Clausewitz,
German military thought was further influenced by the elder Moltke and reached a
dead end in the concepts of Count Alfred von Schlieffen. The author did not have
the opportunity to revise this essay for publication during his lifetime. The only
editing has been

to eliminate obvious inaccuracies and to insure grammatical clarity,

Herbert Rosinski (1903-1962) was born and educated in Germany. He taught at
the German Naval Staff College and left Germany in 1936, a victim of Nazi
persecution. For the remainder of his Jife, he lived in England and the United States.
He is author of The German Army and Power and Human Destiny. in addition to
many artiales published in the United States and abroad. Ed.

SCHARNHORST TO SCHLIEFFEN:
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
GERMAN MILITARY THOUGHT
by

Herbert Rosinski

I
At the same time that in France
Jomini reassembled the various strands
of the French School in his interpreta
tion of Napoleon 1s unprecedente:d series
of overwhelming successes, a new school
of military thought arose in Prussia
under the leadership and guidance of
Scharnhorst; comprising, together with
himself and Clausewitz, two other mili
tary thinkers, well known and highly
esteemed in their own day, but long
buried in complete oblivion from which
they have been rescued only during the
last few years: F.K. von Lossow and
Ruhle von Lilienstern.'
The peculiar characteristic of the
German school was its combination of
wid e practical experience with a

strongly pronounced philosophical
spirit, reflecting the double influence of
Napoleon's revolution of strategy as
well as the deep speculative tendencies
of German thought in this, its classical
age. With Scharnhorst the practical
aspect p redominated; his wide acquaint
a nce with contemporary literature
(hardly philosophy) served only as a
general stimulus and leaven. In Lossow
and Ruhle a dilettante acquaintance
with philosophy led partly to excessive
skepticism and partly to speculative
aberrations, without theoretical or prac�
tical value. Only in Clausewitz, at once a
passionate soJdier, consuming himself all
his life in the vain quest for a sphere of
activity commensurate to his high gifts
and aspfrations, and a natural.born
theorist, a profound grasp both of the
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READING
deal largely with military and political
events,
The author, a professional historian
The American Revolution
of high standing, a longtime scholar of
early American history and culture,
John Adams, the sage of colonial
includes among his many publications
America, raised three questions in 1815:
the highly acclaimed two-volume biog
"Who shall write the history of the
raphy of John Adams. His leitmotif as a
American Revolution? Who can write
historian is that utha truth of an event is
it? Who will ever be able to write it?"
to be found in the full and careful
Page Smith, an eminent 20th century
telling of it-that ... the event, properly
historian, has answered the challenge of
these questions by producing a mam
told contains its own interpretation," In
his latest work he carries out this maxim
moth two*volume tome.* It is a formi
unreservedly.
dable accomplishment and reveals just
Page Smith subtitles his monumental
about everything that anyone would
want to know about the American
work A People's History of the Ameri
can Revolution because he has con
Revolution.
At this time when the book market is
cluded that the Revolution was essen
tially a people's movement. He stresses
flooded with a plethora of books, arti
cles, and mono graphs on the American
the fact that the Revolution, as John
Revolution, the first natural reaction by
Adams wrote, took place in the 11hearts
and minds" of Americans long before
anyone reasonably familiar with this
the direct, revolutionary action hap
period in American history will be to
pened. This is the main theme of his
ask: "Why st!ll two more volumes on
narrative, and he proceeds to trace this
the Revolution?" But one should not be
development in the early chapters on
Intimidated, for this work takes on a
life in colonial America. Professor
new dimension as Professor Smith un
Smith 1 master historian that he is, gives
folds his brilliant and colorful narrative.
an incisive interpretation of this first
The first part of A New Age Now Begins
popular movement of modern times:
is largely social and cultural history
The fact was that nothing like it
describing the emergence of colonial
has happened before in modern
America's consciousness of being
history-the movement of a whole
uniquely uAmericanu and tracing the
people, or enough of them to
slow and unrelenting drift toward inde
make a revolution, to assert them�
pendence, and the remaining portions
selves on the stage of world his•
tory .... The colonists were doing
*Smith, Page. A New Age Now Begins: ll
something so new in human
People's History of the American Revolution
experience that they could only
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), 2 vols,
1899pp.
explain
it in terms of something
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
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their own destinies, a new under•
standing of the relations between
the governors and the governed
developed, a new sense of the
po ten tialitie, that lay in ordinary
men and women 1 a new appreci
ation of possibilities of a better
life for people in every continent
and every nation.

And finally, he adds: "If we can under
stand our proper relation to the Ameri
can Revolution, I believe we will be
much better able to cope with the often
demoralizing a nd confusing world in
which we live today. 11
Hi s last chapter "Nevus Ordo
Seclorum, n which is an impressive sum•
mary of his 1,814 pages of history,
merits a careful reading and will be
welcomed by all for its retrospection.
Because the story of our American
Revolution has been treated by Smith as
all body and soul, it merits a permanent
place in the personal library of every
naval officer at sea or at h ome. Reading
a few chapters, such as the ones on
Arnold's March, the Boston Massacre, or
Bunker Hill, will easily whet the appe•
tite for a complete reading of this
impressive work.

When the reenactment of the battle
at Concord Bridge took place in April
1975, a sign fluttered over the festivities
which read: "The Revolution is not
over. n The words have deep meaning for
the revolution indeed is not over-and
the United States must continue to give
it impetus and direction. America must
reawaken itself to what President Fotd
called the "American concept and ful
fillment of liberty that have truly revo
lutionized the world." Reading these
volumes will be helpful in stimulating
this revival, for Professor S mith has
successfully recreated and revivified the
era of the American Revolution-the
People's Revolution.

AUGUST C. MILLER, JR.
Naval War College

Binkin, Martin, and Record, Jeffrey.
Where Does the Marine Corps Go
From Here? Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1976. 93pp.
This study examines the U.S. Marine
Corps to determine its role in current
and future U-S. defense requirements_
Binkin and Record believe the Marine
Corps with an amphibious assault capa
bility is necessary but that there should
be changes in the Corps' posture and
mission orientation. Their findings are
that the Marine Corps is not organized
to meet the likeliest threats to our
national interests; that its air arm re
quires too large a proportion of the
Marine Corps' budget; and that to main
tain the present size of the Corps, many
people who do not fit the "good men"
category m ust be accepted.
After presenting their critical find
ings the authors make the following
recommendations:
1. R etain only four regiments with
associated air, and structured p rimarily
for amphibious warfare.
2. Transfer one BLT from the Pa
cific to bolster U.S- capabilities in the
Middle East.
3. Sharply reduce the size of the
Marines' tactical air capability.
4- Disband most of the Marine Corps
Reserve.
Should these recommendations be
adopted there would still be a question
of what to do with the remaining
Marine personnel. T he authors offer
four possibilities:
L Reduce USMC personnel ceiling
to reflect the new structure as presented
in the four recommendations stated
above. A personnel strength of 112,000
would result.
2. Assign the Marine Corps ground
responsibility in Asia presently borne by
the Army. Corps personnel strength
here would be 175,000.
3. Give Marines the assignment as
the U.S. quick reaction force, thus
replacing the Army's 82d Airborne Divi
sion. A Corps of 142,000 would result.
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the military, but businessmen are more
hostile toward Socialist and Communist
governments in less-developed countries
than other elites.
Against thil, sort of intriguing point
and counterpoint there is a strong and
revealing analysis of the business and
military press relative to U.S. interven
tion in nine postwar cases which clearly
establishes the influence potential pro
•vided by the specialized media.
Alto gether, this book rewards stu
dent1 teacher, and reader alike. It is a
gold mine of information and insight,
laboriously prepared and documented.
It is nice to know that the Advanced
Research Center of the Naval War Col
lege had the vision to encourage the
authors in their scholarly search.

for cause when they believe that their
duties clash with their Constitutional
loyalty. Such an issue, of course, de
serves extended treatment, but Dickey
has introduced the question well.
A second essay, "The New Military
Professionalism," by C.L. Abercrombie,
III and Army Maj. R.H. Alcala, is a
study of service school instructional
periods and of service professional
journals. The chief finding is that to•
day's professional soldier is becoming
increasingly more involved in political
matters. I have no quarrel with the
quantitative methodology used in this
essay, but I am not at all persuaded that
the authors ever came to grips with
what they mean by "political." In fact,
as I read the essay, it seems as though
the authors have tried almost des
PROFESSOR ROBERT F. DELANEY
perately
to segregate supposedly "mili•
Naval Wax College
tar y" from supposedly "political"
matters-something very hard to do in
Russett, Bruce M. and Stepan, Alfred,
theory and (it seems to me, at least)
eds. Military Force and American
impossible tc do in practice.
Society.. New York: Harper and
In a third article, Jong Ryool Lee
contends that " ... a high defense
Row, 1973. 37lpp.
priority is likely to lead to increased
To put it simply this is a book which
serious students of international rela
foreign commitments and to hurt sound
tions and military affairs will want to
economic growth as well" (p. 62). In
buy and keep in their per sonal libraries.
fact, the article deserves a lengthy treat
ment, both because of its conclusions
It consists of five articles and an an
and because of its quantitative tech
notated research bibliography of some
niques (chiefly, multidimensional
175 pages.
In _,A Personal Statement/' Army
scaling and factor analysis). The author
Maj. James S. Dickey argues cogently
has marshaled a great number of data,
that there exists a " ... need for con
and he uses them convincingly-except
tinuous review of the army's missions
in the case of his impressions of national
with a v,ew toward reducing, wherever
needs as perceived by Presidents. The
possible, their social and political im
use of content analysis to judge such
pact" (p. 32). Dickey is upset-and with
matters seems to me to be highly
good reason-by the number of clearly
unreliable if only because a difference
nonmilitary assignments and missions
often exil,ts between what decision
entrusted to the military in recent years.
makers say the policy is (or, declaratory
While Dickey's essay is largely confined
policy) and what policy really is (or, the
to this principal point of the need to
actual policy). Content analysis simply
insure that the military is responsible
cannot provide for this, and, on this
count, I think the article-which is
for military missions, he raises a number
otherwise absorbing-begins to falter.
of other, equally intriguing, questions.
Wayne Moyer's article ;,, an effort to
For example, Dickey believes that the
use
multiple-regression analysis (and134
Army
should
allow
its
officers
to
resign
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